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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

l/EYO CONCRETE PRODUCTS 1

INC.,
and STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Supreme Court No. 19272

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,:
and SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This
lnJury Fund.

is a worker's compensation case involving Second
The issues in this case involve: first,

construction of Section 35-1-69,

U.C.A.;

second,

the proper

whether the

Administrative Law Judge committed error in discounting the applicant's pre-existing conditions;
<>

and third, what effect, if any,

Statement and Request agreement between State Insurance Fund

and the applicant has

regarding State Insurance Fund's right

to reimbursement from Second Injury Fund.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
A hearing was
Urati,

held September 20, 1982, in St. George,

before an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial Commission

''n an application of Frederick J. Paulus for worker's compensation

benefits

for

an

industrial injury which occurred on August 12,

1978.

(R, 24)

Applicant Paulus claimed benefits based on iniur•v

he sustained to his back and shoulders in a truck accident wh,;
driving as an employee of Veyo Concrete Products,
Utah.

Inc., of

v~)·c,

The Administrative Law Judge entered his Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order on February 7,

1983, holding, among

other things, that State Insurance Fund was liable for all
and temporary total disability compensation payments.

medi~l

(R, 215-216)

Defendant State Insurance Fund filed a Motion for Review
on February 23,

1983,

requesting

hold that there should be a

that the Order be amended to

reimbursement

from Second Injuri·

Fund to State Insurance Fund of 7/13ths of amounts paid on temporary
total and medical compensation.

Applicant Paulus also submittec

a Motion for Review on February 25, 1983, arguing other issues.
On May 17,

1983,

the

Industrial Commission issued'

Denial of Motions for Review, in which it upheld the Administrati'1e
(R, 235-236)

Law Judge's Order.

Writ of Review was granted by the Utah Supreme Court
on June 17, 1983.

Appellants now submit

their brief in this

matter.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Applicants
be

reversed and

request that the Order

remanded.

of the Commissioi

The Commission should be instructed

to order Second Injury Fund to make reimbursement to State Insurance
Fund on the basis of a 7/13 proportion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The basic facts

in this
2

case are not

in dispute

d·''

be
p,, 11 ust
frr.nt

(ecounted briefly.
12,

1978,

tire.

Frederick J. Paulus was injured on

when the truck that he was driving blew a left

The

truck

rolled onto the median, and Mr. Paulus

~5

thrown through the windshield and pinned under the back axle.

The

accident occurred on I-15 in southern Nevada.

Mr.

Pa u 1 us

At the time,

was an employee of Ve yo Concrete Products,

Veyo, Utah.

Inc., of

(R, 12-13)

Mr. Paulus apparently sustained several injuries including
a laceration on the

right side of his forehead,

and injury to both shoulders.

(R, 3)

back injury,

Applicant Paulus underwent

surgery in Cedar City for his left shoulder in November of 1978.
The

surgery was

underwent

a

performed by Ross McNaught, M.D.

Mr. Paulus

similar surgical procedure on the right shoulder

on February 5,

1979.

repaired a second time.

On March 26,

1979,

the left shoulder was

In October of 1979, Mr. Paulus had further

problems with his left shoulder; and Dr. McNaught performed further
surgery on the left shoulder in November of 1979.

(R, 194-195;

210-21i)

On September 11, 1980, applicant Paulus signed a Statement
and Request settlement with State Insurance Fund,
rating of 4%
his shoulders.

receiving a

permanent partial impairment of the whole man for
(R,

9)

In December 1980, Mr. Paulus went to work as a truck
driver for a Mr:. Jim Andrus.
Mr,

~en

Paul us

was on his

his back went out.

In March, 1981, during this employment,

trucking

job for Andrus at Los Angeles

He was bent over and could not straighten
3

up.

His

partner

had

to

drive

the

truck

Mr. Paulus described the pain as being
place as the pain he had had

back

to

St. Georcf

in approximately the

in his back when he first hur:_

back in the truck accident of August 12, 1978.

After some physi:

therapy, Mr. Paulus returned to work in about two or three week 3.
(R, 51-57, 211)
In July, 1981, while still working for Andrus, Mr. PauL
reinjured his back while unloading
City.

55-gallon drums in Salt La(,

He was examined by Dr. Mortenson,

City, and again put on physical therapy.
to work after about three weeks.

a neurosurgeon in Ceda:

Mr. Paulson again returne:

(R, 58-61, 211-212)

A hearing on the matter was held in St. George on Septembe:
20,

1982,

before an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrn

Commission.
panel

The medical
(R,

for evaluation.

panel were adopted by
in his

Findings of

February 7,
panel

are

1983.

set out

questions
184-188)

referred to a med1n:

The findings of the medica

the Administrative Law Judge as his cwr

Fact,
(R,

were

Conclusions of Law and Order, issuec

210-216)

in full

in

The conclusions of the medica.
the Appendix

I,

attached herecc.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH STATE INSURANCE FUND IS ENTITLED
TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM SECOND INJURY FUND
FOR 7/13THS OF AMOUNTS PAID, UNDER SECTION
35-1-69 U.C.A., BECAUSE APPLICANT'S PERMANENT
PARTIAL IMPAIRMENT RESULTING FROM HIS INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN IT
WOULD HAVE BEEN BUT FOR HIS PRE-EXISTING
INCAPACITY.
4

Section 35-1-69,
15

t.t1e

pre-1981

U.C.A.,

was amended in 1981; but it

version of this Section which applies in the

nre.sPnt case as the accident in the course of Mr. Paulus' employment

occurred in August of 1978.

U.S.F.

Utah, 657 P.2d 764, 768 (1983).

&

G. v. Industrial Commission,

At the time of applicant Paulus's

August 1978 injuries, Section 35-1-69, U,C,A.

(1953, as amended),

read in pertinent part:
(1) if any employee who has previously incurred
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury,
disease, or congenital causes, sustains an
industrial injury for which compensation
and medical care is provided by this title
that results in permanent incapacity which
is substantially greater than he would haye
incur red had he not had the pre-existing
incapacity, compensation and medical care,
which medical care and other related items
are outlined in Section 35-1-81, shall be
awarded on the basis of the combined injuries,
but the liability for the employer for such
compensation and medical care shall be for
the industrial injury only and the remainder
shall be paid out of the special fund provided
for Section 35-1-68(1) hereinafter referred
to as the "special fund"
(emphasis added)
(The entire pre-1981 amendment Section is
attached hereto as Appendix II)

In dispute is the meaning and application of the phrase underlined
'lbove.

The

Utah

Supreme Court

has

had occassion to

the pre-1981 version of this provision a number of times.
Y...

review
~

United States Steel Corp., Utah, 551 P.2d 504 (1976); Intermountain

!Leo.1th Care

Inc.,

y. Ortega,

Utah,

562 P,2d 617

(1977);

~

Y.._lndustrial Commission, Utah, 604 P.2d 478 (1979); and Intermountain
3J11titing Cor9. y. Capitano, Utah, 610 P.2d 334 (1980).
The

Utah

Supreme Court
5

clarified

this

provision in

Internountain Healthcare.

Inc. v. Ortega, supra,

In that case

the claimant had a pre-existing psychological condition relatiw:
to pain in her back.

The Commission found

that the claimo,:

had a permanent partial disability of 30%, 10% attributable t:
her pre-existing psychological condition and 20% attributable
to an accident which occured while on the
failed

however,

to

job.

The Commission,

require the Second Injury Fund to pay its

proportionate share of medical expenses and the temporary total
disability compensation.

The Utah Supreme Court held that Section

35-1-69 required the Second Injury Fund to pay l/3rd of the medical
expenses and temporary total disability compensation, because
l/3rd of the employee's permanent partial disability was attributable
to her pre-existing condition.

In coming to this decision, the

Utah Supreme Court stated:
The requirement that the pre-existing condition
combines with the later injury to cause a
"substantially greater" permanent incapacity
does not mean that the former must be greater
than the later.
It simply means that it
be some definite and measurable portion of
the causation of the disability.
I t surely
cannot be doubted that 30% is substantially
greater than 20%, nor that 10% disability
is itself substantial in that it is definite
and measurable.
Consequently, inasmuch as
it appears that the pre-existing condition
increased the resulting disability by one-third,
it follows that under the requirements of
the statute, the medical expenses as well
as the compensation award should have been
apportioned two-thirds from the employer
and one-third from the special fund.
(emphasis
added)
562 P.2d at 619.
The ~ decision has not been overruled or modified
since,

so the above-quoted standard must be viewed as a ·iali•.i
6

'"te•~retation

of Section 35-1-69.

In the present case, the Administrative Law Judge adopted
111 e

f

c;,,it_

1

nd i ngs of the medical panel.

~ppl

The medical panel concluded

icant Paul us Is total physical impairment from all causes

was 13%; 7 of the 13% was due to pre-existing causes, which consisted

of a left
5%.

knee

Thus,

impairment of 2%

and a

under the Ortega standard,

incapacity is

low-back impairment of
Mr. Paulus's permanent

"substantially greater than he would have incurred

if be had not had the pre-existing incapacity."
of

~.

In the language

it surely cannot be doubted that 13% is substantially

greater than 6%

(that attributable to the industrial accident)

nor that a 7% disability (that attributable to pre-existing condition)
is itself substantial

in that

it is definite and measurable.

Consequently, inasmuch as it appears that the pre-existing condition
increased the resulting incapacity by 7/13, it follows that under
the requirement of the statute,

the medical expenses as well

as the temporary total compensation award should be apportioned
6/13ths from the employer and 7/13ths from Second Injury Fund.
The

standard

announced and applied

in

~.

is a

simple additive analysis of the "substantially-greater requirement,"
rather than a

causal analysis.

That is,

immaterial whether the pre-existing condition
incapacity resulting from the industrial
lhan it otherwise would be.

from the

industrial
7

~

injury,

~.

it is

the permanent

injury to be greater

Under Ortega,

'he pre-existing incapacity adds to
resulting

under

it is enough that

the permanent incapacity
so that the employee's

total permanent partial incapacity is significantly greater.
This analysis was recently confirmed in Kincheloe
Cola Bottling Co. of Ogden, Utah, 656 P.2d 440 (1982).

In

y.~:

KincbeJ~,

the Administrative Law Judge held that Second Injury Fund hau
no application.
1980

One of the Judge's reasons

industrial

injury was

from an injury in 1974.

was that the claimant's

"unrelated" to his prior incapacity

Commenting on this point, the Utah Suprer, 1e

Court stated:
Under the reasoning of Cai;:>itano, the
fact that the 1980 injury is unrelated to
the 1974 injury is not dispositive. Irresi;:>ectiye
of any causal connection, the Second Injury
Fund is to compensate one who sustains "permanent
incapacity which is substantially greater
than he would have incurred if he had not
had the pre-existing incapacity." 656 P.2d
at 442 (note dropped, emphasis added).
This arrangement was later limited by the 1981 amendment
to Section 35-1-69.

Under part (b) of the second paragraph (added

in the 1981 amendment)

awards for combined injuries where there

is no aggravation between the pre-existing condition and the
industrial

injury a percentage-impairment threshold was added.

This provision,

of course, does not apply to the present case,

since the applicant's industrial injury occurred before the effective
date of the 1981 amendment.
The analysis of Section 35-1-69 urged by appellants
was also confirmed in White y. Industrial Commission, Utah, 604
P.2d 478

(1979).

In ill:l.i.ll,

each of which depended upon
35-1-69.

the Court consolidated three cases,
judicial

construction of Sectiur.

In each of the consolidated cases,
8

the employee hac

', 1 ,1nificant
1 ,,Justrial

physical
injury.

errnanent partial
•nditions,
In

incapacity before he or she sustained the
In two of the cases 50% of the applicant's

impairment was attributable to pre-existing

the other half attributable to the industrial injury.

the third case,

75% of the total physical impairment of the

applicant was attributable to the previously existing impairments
and 25% was attributed to the industrial accident.

In reviewing

all three cases, the Utah Supreme Court merely noted the percentage
amounts of pre-existing condition and impairments attributable
to the industrial
any of the

injuries.

It did not discuss the nature of

injuries involved in any of the three cases nor did

it discuss any possible causal relationships between pre-existing
conditions and the later
only at the

industrial

injuries.

Thus,

looking

percentage amounts of pre-existing impairment and

percentage amounts

from the industrial injuries,

the Supreme

Court held that the Second Injury Fund was required to reimburse
the insurance carrier for

the proportion of medical expenses

and temporary total disability compensation equal to the percentage
of permanent partial disability applicable to the pre-existing
iniuries.
In the 1980 case of

Intermountain Smelting Corp. y.

Caritano, Utah, 610 P.2d 334, appellants' interpretation of Section
35-1-69 was again confirmed.

In that case a construction worker

severly injured his right ankle.
that the claimant had a
I 12%

The Commission adopted findings

25% permanent partial disability, 16

attributable to a pre-existing injury to his left leg from
9

being shot in the service in Korea and 8 1/2% attributable to
the industrial injury.
Injury Fund)

In Cagitano, the special fund (now Seco 11 ,,

urged that it should not be required to bear

at1,

of the expenses, inasmuch as the claimant's pre-existing condit 1011
had nothing to do with the industrial injury.
addressed this argument,

first quoting Section 35-1-69 itself.

The Court acknowledged that the
special fund was

interpretation offered by the

"not entirely without logic and plausability",

but noted that it is the Court's
and apply the statute as
purpose.

The Court expressly

Accordingly,

responsibility to interpret

it is written in accordance with its

the Court concluded that the employer

is responsible only for the percentage of compensation and medical
care which the injury occuring in his employment bears to the
applicant's total disability,

the

reimbursed by the special fund.

610 P.2d at 336-337.

In support of

his

remainder to be paid out or

holding

in his Findings of Fact,

Conclusion of Law and Order, of February 7, 1983, the Administrative
Law Judge cited the
Commission,
this case,

Utah,

recent case of U.S.F.

657 P.2d 764

however,

(1983).

&

(R,

G. v. Industrial
215)

A review of

does not appear to offer any guidance one

way or the other as to the proper interpretation and application
of the pre-1981 version of Section 35-1-69.

F i rs t , the case

comes in 1983 and considers Section 35-1-69 in its post-19 81
amendment version.
at all,

Second, insofar as it discusses Section 35-1-6 9

the case merely restates the statute itself.

states:
10

The Courr

Explicit ~tatutory authority exists to apportion
compensation awards and medical costs between
employers and the Second Injury Fund, provided
pertinent co~ditions are met.
Basically,
those conditions are three in number: 1)
permanent incapacity occassioned by accidental
injury, disease or congential causes, followed
by 2) subsequent injury resulting in further
permanent incapacity which is 3) substantially
greater than that which would have been incurred
if there had been no pre-existing incapacity.
657 P.2d at 767.
This passage simply does not help determine the issue in the
present case.
To summarize, the pre-1981 version of Section 35-1-69,
as interpreted by the relevant case law, clearly supports appellants'
contention that State Insurance Fund is entitled to reimbursement
from Second Injury Fund for a portion of medical expenses and
compensation based on the ratio of applicant Paulus's pre- existing
impairment to the impairment he sustained in his industrial injury,
in this case 7/13.
~w

The recent case cited by the Administrative

Judge in his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,

does not indicate anything to the contrary, nor does it support
the Commission's holding.
POINT II
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S REASONING
THAT ONE OF APPLICANT'S PRE-EXISTING
CONDITIONS PROVIDED NO BASIS FOR SECOND INJURY
FUND AWARD WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROPER
CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 35-1-69.
In his Order, the Administrative Law Judge took the
view that

all of Mr. Paulus's back problems ei"ther pre-existed

his 1978 accident, or were the result of a natural, progressive
aegenerative condition.

The Administrative Law Judge also adopted
11

the finding of the medical panel that there was no connection
between Mr. Paulus's lower back problems and his industrial accident:
1. There is not a medically demonstrable
causal connection between the low back problem
complained of and the industrial accident.
This man has had back symptoms as far back
as 1975 and has had intermitent back symptoms
since that time that in general have been
progressively increasing. There is no evidence
that any of the three accidents of 8-12-78,
March 1981 or July 1981, have had any demonstrable lasting effect on his back condition.
(R, 212)
It was with these adopted facts that the Administrative Law Judge
offered one reason for not requiring the Second Injury Fund to
participate in payment of medical expenses and compensation.
His reasoning is as follows:
As to the 5% impairment to the back existing
before August 1978, we have a more difficult
question.
The Administrative Law Judge finds
that the applicant cannot recover from the
Second Injury Fund for the 5% impairment
of the back as it existed prior to the August
1978 injury for three reasons:

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

* *

*

*

2. The second reason is simply that there
can be no Second Injury Fund award since
there is no new industrial injury or even
a basis for an industrial award.
(R, 215)
The Administrative Law Judge's reasoning here apparentiJ
refers to Mr. Paulus's 5% permanent partial impairment from his
pre-existing back condition.
did not

The fact that his industrial iniurr

reinjure or aggravate his pre-existing back conditior,

is irrelevant.

As argued under Point I, no medical causal connection

between the industrial

injury and pre-existing conditions neeJ
12

exist in order for Second Injury Fund to be liable for a portion
<>f medical expenses and compensation.
Mr.

Following

the~

standard,

Paulus's pre-existing back condition was rateable at 5% and

thus v;as a

"definite and measurable portion of the causation

ur the disability" and most certainly even unrelated physical
impairments can and do have an effect on an individual's overall
employability that is the very thing that Second Injury Funds
are designed to protect.
POINT III
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ERRED IN MAINTAINING
THAT ONE OF APPLICANT'S PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS
WAS NOT REALLY A PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT.
In his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,
the Administrative Law Judge stated:
2.
The second reason is simply that there
can be no Second Injury Fund award since
there is no new industrial injury or even
a basis for an industrial award.
1'.h2..l.l.gh
the panel found that the applicant had a
2% increase in impairment. this was not in
reality a permanent increase since it could
be corrected by minor surgery.
(R, 215,
emphasis added)
The Judge's statement concerning a 2% increase in impairment
apparently refers to the 2% impairment of the left knee pre-existing
Whether this impairment is permanent

the August 1978 accident.

or could be corrected by minor surgery, as asserted by the Administrative Law Judge,
(R,

194-203)

is not stated in the medical panel report.

There is no evidence upon which the Commission

could base such an opinion.

The conclusion of the medical panel

in this regard is found under the question asking about permanent
13

impairment and is answered as follows:
(5)
b. There is a minor calcification of
the proximal end of the medial collateral
ligament of the left knee at its proximal
end over the medial femoral condyle indicitive
of "Pelligrini-Stieda calcification of the
left medial collateral ligament"
related
to his 1975 accident.
This represents 5%
impairment of the extremity or 2% impairment
of the body.
(R, 213-214)
The Administrative Law Judge simply erred on this point,
The Judge's

statement is purely speculative and not supported

by any evidence
rated

it

as

a

in the case.

permanent

The medical panel would not have

impairment

if

In the absence of conflicting medical
fact
panel.

it was not permaner.t,
evidence,

cannot dis regard the evidence of the Commission- appointed
In the present case, Mr. Paul us' s knee condition resulted

from a glider crash in 1975.

(R, 199)

It should be noted that at point
panel

the trier cf

report as

medical panel

( 9)

in the medica:

adopted by the Administrative Law Judge, the

rates Mr.

partial impairment but,

Paulus's left shoulder at 4% permanent
at the same time,

advises that future

surgery might well be expected to reduce this impairment by 21.
In that instance, the Administrative Law Judge did have a conclusion
of the medical panel that future medical procedure could reduce
the percentage of

impairment.

Law Judge in his Order,

Nevertheless,

accepts

the Administrative

the left shoulder impairrnen'.

as a 4% permanent partial impairment.
Even

if

the

Commission was

correct

in

its analysis

of the 2% left knee impairment, there still remains the 5% permanent
14

partial
1~1,e

impairment of the lower back, which existed prior to

accident of August of 1978.

1 mpairrnent

from all

due to

with

6%

b-id

condition.

Mr. Paulus's total physical

causes would then be 11%, instead of 13%,

the accident and 5% due to the pre-existing low
In that case,

State Insurance Fund should be

reimbursed by the Second Injury Fund on the basis of the fraction
5/11.

That

is

to say,

the Second Injury Fund should reimburse

state Insurance Fund for 5/llths of the temporary total compensation
and medical costs.
POINT IV
THE STATEMENT AND REQUEST AGREEMENT BETWEEN
APPLICANT AND THE STATE INSURANCE FUND DOES
NOT CUT OUT THE APPLICANT'S PRE-EXISTING
PERMANENT PARTIAL IMPAIRMENT RATING, AS IMPLIED
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND THEREFORE
CANNOT BE A BAR TO THE REIMBURSEMENT ENTITLEMENT
OF THE STATE INSURANCE FUND.
The
in his Order

first
for

reason the Administrative Law Judge gave

not apportioning the liability for benefits

concerns the Statement-and-Request Settlement form signed between
the State Insurance Fund

and the applicant.

The Judge argues

as follows:
As to the 5% impairment to the back
existing before August 1978, we have a more
difficult question.
The Administrative Law
Judge finds that the applicant cannot recover
from the Second Injury Fund for the 5% impairment
of the back as it existed prior to the August
1978 injury for three reasons:
l.
That the Statement and Request
was agreed to and signed, allowing the applicant
a 4% permanent partial impairment rating
following the 1978 incident.
This agreement
becomes a full accord and satisfaction binding
on the applicant as to all claims prior to
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the signing of that document and acceptance
of the 4% benefits.
It cannot be called
res judicata because the Commission did not
enter an Order, however, the accord and satisfaction forecloses the applicant from renegotiating the benefits he was entitled
to at that time at some later date much the
same as res adjudicata. (R, 215)
The Administrative Law Judge implies by this argument
that the permanent partial

impairment

rating of 4%,

to which

Mr. Paulus agreed, included any and all permanent partial impairment,
that existed prior to the August 1978 industrial injury, in particular
the 5% pre-existing back injury.

The Statement and Request agreement

cannot be so construed, however.
Such settlement agreements must be narrowly construed
to cover only those claims or

rights specifically mentioned.

Professor A. Larson states:
Section 82.51 General rule: only s~ecifically
mentioned claims included
A settlement covers only those claims
or rights that are specifically mentioned
in the agreement.
Thus claims for a latent
injury unknown at the time of the settlement,
or subsequent injuries, or for ~rior injuries
not covered in the agreement have been held
not barred by a settlement agreement. Larson,
Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol 3, Section
82.51 (footnotes dropped, emphasis added).
The 4% permanent partial

impairment mentioned in tt.e

Statement and Request refers only to the condition of Mr. Paulus' 3
shoulders.

This is

recognized by the Administrative Law Judge '

at the hearing:
The Court:
The signature was he signed away
a Statement of Request for a 4% permanent
partial impairment of his shoulders.
Mr. Julien:

That's correct.
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(R, 27)

rt is also quite clear from the wording in the statement and
R~guest:

• for a permanent partial impairment
4% of the whole man as rated by Dr. Ross
McNaught, M.D. {R, 9)
The

record discloses

that the

rating made by Dr. McNaught, as

of the date of the settlement agreement
was

1980),

the rating he gave Mr. Paulus in a letter of June 30, 1980.

It is clear
he

{September 4,

is

from Dr. McNaught's discussion in his letter that

referring only to Mr. Paulus's shoulders when he makes

the 4% rating.

Referring to the shoulders, Dr. McNaught writes:

There is some residual stiffness which certainly
may improve with time, but at present it
is about a 6% upper extremity impairment,
or a 4% whole man impairment. {R, 83)
Given all
Mr.

this,

it would be perverse to believe that

Paulus thought he was agreeing to a rating including

~

and all of his physical impairments and not just his shoulders.
Since the Statement and Request agreement refers only
to the shoulder condition of Mr. Paulus,
the ratings for Mr.

it does not concern

Paulus's pre-exisiting conditions.

Mr. Paulus

did not sign away any permanent partial impairment rating for
pre-existing conditions;
irn~airment,

and since he did have a pre-existing

the Second Injury Fund becomes liable for its propor-

tionate share of Mr. Paulus's temporary total compensation benefits
and medical expenses under Section 35-1-69.
As found by the medical panel, the rating for pre-existing
impairment is 7%, 5% for low back condition and 2% for left knee
,:ondition.

{R,

202)

In his Order, the Administrative Law Judge
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adopted the findings of the medical panel that Mr. Paulus's total
physical

impairment

from all causes was 13%.

For this reasor,,

appellants contend that 7/13 is the proper proportion of reimburse
ment it should receive from Second Injury Fund.
If the 4%
adopted to

mentioned in the Statement and Request were

rate Mr. Paul us' s

shoulder condition,

impairment rating would be 11%.

then his total

Combining this with the rating

for pre-exisi ting impairment, the fr action would then be 7 /11--meaning
that Second Injury Fund would be liable for a larger portion.
Whether the

proper portion of reimbursement by Second

Injury Fund to State Insurance Fund should be 7/13 or 7/11, it
is perfectly clear that Mr. Paul us did not sign away any claims
based on pre-existing impairment and that,

therefore, Seconc

Injury Fund is liable for reimbursement to State Insurance Fund.
POINT V
THE FACT THAT SECOND INJURY FUND WAS NOT
A PARTY TO THE STATEMENT AND REQUEST AGREEMENT
DOES NOT RELEASE IT FROM LIABILITY BASED
ON APPLICANT'S PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS.
In the
Commission,

recent case of Rhodes Pump Sales y. Industrial

Utah,

No. 19163,

filed April 26,

1984, the Supreme

Court held that the State Insurance Fund was entitled to an apportionment between it and the Second Injury Fund for medical expenses
and temporary total disability benefits it had paid to the claimant.
The Court held Second Injury Fund liable, even though a settlemer.t
agreement had been signed which made no mention of any pre-existing
condition and to which Second Injury Fund was not a party.
Court's reason for so holding was
18

The

were
in part that the parties

unaware of the pre-existing condition at the time of the settlement
agreement.
The present case is similar in that the State Insurance
Fund did not know of any pre-existing conditions at the time
the Statement and Request was signed.

It was for this reason

that no pre-existing conditions were referred to in the Statement
and Request

(See Point IV); and it was also for this reason that

Second Injury Fund was not made a party to the Statement and
Request settlement agreement.
As set out in the Statement of Facts, above, the Statement
and Request was signed

~

Mr. Paulus had aggravated his back

problems in March and April, 1981, while working for Mr. Andrus.
More importantly, the record reveals that no mention was anywhere
made of a pre-existing back condition prior to the Statement
and Request settlement agreement of September 11, 1980.

In his

letter of November 11, 1978, Dr. McNaught notes "some type of
back injury" from the accident; but he does not mention any preexisting back condition.

(R,

3)

Neither is any pre-existing

condition mentioned in his letter of June 30, 1980.

(R,

11)

There is no reference to any pre-existing condition in the early
hospital and medical reports.

(R,

5-6)

No mention of a pre-

existing condition is made on the Employee's Statement of September
18, 1978;

and the shoulder condition is the only problem noted

on Mr. Paulus's Application for a Hearing of February 2, 1979.
IR, 8,

12)

c,f September

According to Mr. Paulus's testimony at the hearing
20, 1982, he did not receive any treatment for his
19

low back

from the

(R, 71-72)

time of his accident until January 30, 1981 .

In fact, the subject of pre-existing conditions actual!.

did not come to the attention of the State Insurance Fund unt,
after the hearing of September 20, 1982--well after the State 11 , , , .
and Request settlement agreement.
After the hearing, State Insurance Fund acquired additior.a.
medical
problems.

records

that indicated Mr. Paulus had pre-existing bac•

At the hearing,

additional medical doctors were fLst

brought to the attention of the parties other than Mr. Paulus.
Counsel for

the

State Insurance Fund immediately after receipt

submitted those records
the

additional

records

to

the Administrative

were

forwarded

to

the

Law Judge; and
medical panel.

(R, 189-191) These medical records are at pages 136-144 and 151-1;5

of the present Record.

1

In view of the above

recounted facts and the Suprerr.e

Court holding in Rhodes Pump Sales,
Fund should not be

released

supra,

the Second Iniur)'

from liability for

apportionment

with State Insurance Fund on the basis of the Statement and Request
settlement agreement

in this case.

The Rhodes Pump Sales case

is dispositive of that issue without further argument.
CONCLUSION
Based on the pre-1981 version of Section 35-1-69, U.C.A.,
and the supporting case
entitled to

law,

reimbursement

the Utah State Insurance Fund is

from Second

Injury Fund for 7/lJths

1 The table of contents to the Supreme Court Record mistaken::
indicates that these medical records were part of the Exh1b~t"
D-1 through D-6, submitted at the hearing of September 20, 19S,.
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"

;imounts paid to applicant Paulus for

tf"'flC'tary total compensation benefits.
,1
0

medical expenses and

None of the reasons mentioned

the Administrative Law Judge in his Order of February 7, 1983,

r1ect

this

.·,plied that

conclusion.

Although the Administrative Law Judge

Mr. Paulus's pre-existing back condition would have

ru aggravate or be aggravated by his industrial injury in order
tu receive any Second Injury Fund award, the question of aggravation
is irrelevant under
Although
knee

the pre-1981 version of Section 35-1-69.

the Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Paulus's

condition as

not

really a permanent impairment, this was

error because the only medical evidence in the record is to the
contrary.
Finally,

although the Administrative Law Judge refers

to the Statement and Request agreement,
at all

affect Second

State Insurance Fund.
to any pre-existing
tne State

Injury Fund's liability for

reimbursing

First, the agreement itself does not refer
impairments and thus,

applicant Paulus and

Insurance Fund cannot be understood to have signed

away any permanent partial
conditions.
;:arty to

that agreement does not

Second,

impairment

the fact

rating for pre-existing

that Second Injury Fund was not

the Statement and Request agreement cannot release it

from liability in this case,

because State Insurance Fund was

unaware of any pre-existing conditions at the time of the agreement.
Accordingly,
<s liable

for

it must be concluded that the Second Injury Fund
reimbursement to the State Insurance Fund on the

basis of applicant's pre-existing impairments and that the proper
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fraction for the apportionment is 7/13 in this case.
DATED THIS

~~~Day

of May, 1984.
BLACK & MOORE

"~Ml
a:Es &M
R.

MAILING CE

BACK

FICATE

I hereby certify ~,M,t a true and correct copy of t~."
foregoing BRIEF was sent this -ft!i!LDay of May, 1984, to the followw
Mr. Stephen W. Julien
Attorney for Applicant
P.O. Box 1538
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Frank V. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Industrial
Commission of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Gilbert Martinez
Second Injury Fund
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPENDIX

# I

0

(j

u

)

'J

iJ 9

'·
Paye r1 in~
Frederick J. Paulus
Re:

lated to the episode of July 1981.
(5)
a.
There is permanent physical impairment attributciLle to progressive degenerative lumbar spine disorder
which appears to be gradually progressive over a period
of time from 1975 and currently the equivalent of 10%
permanent physical impairment of the body as a whole.
S% (or 1/2) was present previous to 8-12-78. The other
5% (or 1/2) has been due to natural progression of his
a~generative disc disease since B-12-78 and not a result
of the episodes at work relating to his back.
b.
There is a minor calcification of the proximal
end of the medial collateral ligament of the left knee
at its proximal end over the medial femoral condyle indicative of "Pelligrini-Stieda calcification of the
left medial collateral ligament" related to his 1975
accident.
This represents 5% impairment of the extremity or 2% impairment of the body.
(6)
Applicant's total physical impairment if any resulting from all causes and conditions is as follows:
Right shoulder
Left shoulder
Left knee
Low back

2%
4%
2%
5%
Total

13%

due to this accident
due to this accident
due to accident of 19 75
2rior to accident of 8-12-78
Combined 13%

In this case the combined is the same value as the total
of the numbers.
(7)
There has been 5% additional permanent physical impairment of the low back from gradual progressive disorder of the lumbar spine since the industrial injury.
( 8)
The surgeries and medical procedures performed were
necessitated by the applicant's industrial accident.
(9)
The applicant would well be served by excision of
the outer end of the left clavicle which would be expected to reduce his permanent physical impairment by 2% and
would result in a moderate losttime of 4 to 8 weeks depending upon his activies. At some future time he may
require the same p•ocedure on the right shoulder. If
such a procedure is.performed on the right shoulder i
would not reduce the permanent impairment below the p
send rating of 2%.
No additional medical treatment or medication appears
Le reasonably required in treating the applicant's problems from the industrial injury.
(10)
I believe that this questions has received a comprehensive answer in the above.
If there remains any

u

u .. :.:

....

~-·~~~~~~~~~-:-:-~:---::-:--~-:-:::---;---:----:-~-:-".""."'""""."'."~~~--------

l)
,j
Page ten
Re:
Frederick J. Paulus

-

')

0

question please contact this examiner.
Very sincerely,
')

B/fzc:!:2::!0:1
BGH:hh

APPENDIX

ti

II

35-1-GD. Combined injuries resulting in permanent incapacity-Ba.sis
of compensation-Special ftind-Trainin:; of employee.-( I) Jf u11y ernpl"j 1:c w)10 )1;\::i J!t't'\l1 1thly 11u·11ricd a pcri11n11c11t incapa<'ity by ac.:t.'.idcntal
111Jury, di:-.case, or corigc111tal causes, sustains au industrial injury for which
1_·q111pen~ation and 111ed1(';d C'are io:; provided by this title that results in
p1'r111auent iucapacJty w·hicli is substantially greater than he would have
1n\'11rred 1f he l1;1d 11ot !1:id tl1r pri.:-cxisting incap;:icity, compensation and
medical tare, which medical eare an<l other related items are outlined in
:-.edJOu :Jj-1-1'1, shalt be a\\-ardc<l 011 the basis of the con1bi11cd injuries, but
the liabil1ty of the crnploycr for such to111pc11sation and 111c<lical care shall
Le fur !l1c i11dui.,t1 ial 111j11r y u1ily and tl1c I"t'!ll1ti11dcr sludl Le p<1id out of tho
special fllnd provideU for i11 scctiou JG-I-G8 ( l) hcrri11afler rcl"crrcd to us
l!1c "~pecinl funJ."
A 1ncLlicnl pnncl liuriug the q11nliticntioJ1.s of tlrn mcJicnl pnnel set
forth iu !lectiou :J::J-'.!-CiG, shall rcric\v all n1eLlical a~pcds of tlie case aml
deterwine first, the total pcrmauent physical i111pa1r111cut resulting from
all causes anLl conditions wcluding the industrial injury; sccoud, the percentage of permanent physical impairwcnt attriLutablc to the iuclustrial
11tJury; n11J tl11nl, t!1c percentage of pcn11u11ct1t pl1y:->1cal impairiucnt attr1LutuLlc to previously existing conditioH.~ whether Jue to accidental
111Jury, Ji~ca<.,c ur cur1~enital causes. 'l'lie iuJustrial cornn1i.s~io11 sl111ll tlie11
assess the linLility for compensation llll<l medical cnrc to the employer 011
the Lasis of the pcrecutagc of permanent physical impa1rznent attributable
to Lite wdustnal inJury only and the rernainder shall he payable out of
the ~aid :,pecial fu11d. A111ouuis, if any, which have Lcca paid by the employer in excess of tlic portion attributable to the said industrial injury
shnll be relwburseJ to-tlie e!llploycr out of said spcc.:ial fund.
(2) ln adJitio11 the commission in its discretion H1ay increase the
weekly cu111pcn~atw11 rale~ Lo Le puiJ out of .sw.:J1 spct:ial furn.I, ouch iucrcase to Le u~cJ for the rchabililation and training uf auy employeo
coinrng witl11u the proYi~ious of tliis chapter as uiay be certified to the
commission by t!ie rehabilitation department of the state Loard of education
as Lerng clig1blc for ~·eliabilitation and training i proviJeJ, however, that
in no case shall there be paid out of such special fund for rehabilitation
au auiouut in excess of $1,000.

